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Abstract— Network Coding has significantly shown the 
achievable throughput and robustness in wireless Networks. 
However, network coding-enabled networks are susceptible to 
pollution attacks where a small number of polluted messages 
will propagate due to recoding and corrupt bunches of 
legitimate messages. Several lightweight Homomorphic 
Message Authentication Code (HMAC) schemes have been 
proposed for protecting the transmitted data against pollution 
attacks; however, most of them are not appropriate for 
wireless networks or cannot resist tag pollution attacks. In this 
paper, we present a computationally efficient null space-based 
homomorphic MAC scheme, for network coding-enabled 
wireless networks. The proposed scheme makes use of two 
types of tags (i.e., MACs and D-MACs) to provide resistance 
against data pollution and tag pollution attacks. Furthermore, 
we demonstrate that due to its lightweight nature, our 
proposed scheme incurs a minimal complexity compared to 
other related schemes. 
Keywords— Network coding, security, homomorphic 
message authentication code, data pollution attack, tag pollution 
attack. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Network Coding (NC) is a promising technology which 
is used nowadays in various applications over a wide 
spectrum of networks, such as wireless mesh networks [1], 
wireless sensor networks [2] and peer-to-peer networks [3]. 
NC was introduced for the first time by Ahlswede et al [4]. 
In contrast to the classical commodity flow, in which the 
information is only routed or replicated, in a NC-enabled 
network the information flow can also employ coding 
operations at the nodes. Linear Network Coding (LNC) 
which is based on linear combinations of the incoming 
packets was appeared further [5]. Random linear Network 
Coding (RLNC) was studied by Ho et al. in [6] as a fully 
distributed method for performing network coding. There is 
a possibility that each node in the network independently and 
randomly selects a set of coefficients and uses them to make 
linear combinations of the data symbols. In particular, RLNC 
was introduced by showing all properties of network coding 
with achieving the maximum capacity.  
  Despite its benefits, RLNC-enabled networks are more 
susceptible to pollution attacks than the traditional store-and-
forward ones. Even a small number of polluted (i.e., 
modified) messages can infect a large number of 
downstream nodes because the pollution propagates via 
recoding. If a data pollution attack is not detected at the 
forwarders (i.e., intermediate nodes), then the sink nodes will 
not be able to recover the source messages correctly.  
 So far, several information-theoretic schemes [7, 8] and 
cryptographic schemes [9-18] have been proposed to secure 
network coding against data pollution attacks. However, 
information-theoretic schemes can only detect data pollution 
attacks at the sink side. On the other hand, cryptographic 
schemes, such as homomorphic hash functions [10], 
signatures [19, 20] and homomorphic MACs [15] enable the 
intermediate nodes to detect data pollution attacks. Among 
the proposed cryptographic schemes, MAC can be used as a 
low-complexity solution for data pollution detection. More 
explicitly, a MAC or tag is a small piece of information 
appended to the end of the message packet. This piece of 
information is the output of a MAC function taking as inputs 
the message packet and a secret key. However, MAC is 
vulnerable to tag pollution attacks. These attacks are more 
sophisticated pollution attacks where attackers pollute (i.e., 
modify) tags instead of the messages’ content. Hence, a 
message packet with polluted tags is possible to travel 
multiple hops before it is detected and cause to a waste of 
bandwidth. Therefore, a number of MAC-based schemes 
have been also proposed in order to address this issue. 
The RIPPLE, TESLA and TESLA-Based schemes are 
resistant against tag pollution attacks [16, 21, 22]. However, 
in these schemes, each node is required to be synchronized 
with the other nodes. Moreover, the authors in [18] presented 
a hybrid authentication scheme which is based on 
homomorphic MACs and homomorphic signatures. Their 
scheme can resist against data and tag pollution. However, 
the verification phase increases the computational 
complexity and delay of the scheme.  
Hence, to detect both data pollution and tag pollution 
attacks in an efficient way, we propose an efficient null 
space-based homomorphic MAC scheme, for RLNC-enabled 
wireless networks. According to our scheme, the source 
generates multiple MACs and D-MACs for each message 
packet. The former one ensures the integrity of the packet 
and the latter one ensures the integrity of the MACs. We 
show that our scheme can resist against data and tag 
pollution attacks. 
     The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. In Section II, 
the background is given. In Section III, the proposed scheme 
is discussed. Furthermore, in Section IV the correctness of 
the proposed scheme is given. In Section V, we provide a 
discussion. Our performance evaluation takes place in 
Section VI. Finally, Section VII concludes the paper.  
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Random Linear Network Coding-Enabled Network 
     To study secure network coding, we consider a triple 
( , , )G S I  which consists of the following components: 
•  Directed multigraph G : We consider a pair of 
( , )V E  as a directed acyclic graph where V  and 
E  are the node and edge set of G , respectively. 
• Source node S : In our network model, we have 
a source S which wants to multicast its 
messages. To achieve that, each message is 
divided into a sequence of packets and these 
packets are sent to the destinations. Each packet 
consists of a number of symbols.  
• A set of Intermediate and Sink nodes I : We 
define relay and sink nodes in a set of nodes 
which is defined as: { }{ }.I x V S= ∀ ∈ −   
In this sense, a traditional multicast scenario is used where 
the source S wants to send its native data packets to multiple 
destinations. We consider a basic scenario based on a line 
network in which there is a RLNC based communication via 
three nodes: A source node encodes the native data packets 
and floods them into the network; an intermediate node 
recodes the incoming encoded packets and forwards them 
toward the sink nodes, and the sink nodes decode the 
incoming coded packets to extract the native packets. Prior to 
transmission, the source divides each native data packets into 
a sequence of packets and partitions them into generations. 
Thus, we consider that each generation consists of m  
packets denoted as 1 2, ,..., mu u u  . Each packet iu , for
1 i m≤ ≤  , is represented as a vector 1,..., nu u  in the finite 
field npF . Then, the source S generates an augmented packet 
iu  for each packet iu by prefixing iu  with the 
thi  unit 
vector of dimension m . A simple description of RLNC is 
depicted in Figure 1. 
The augmented packet is represented as a row vector in the 
finite field m np
+
F  as follows: 
 (1) 
After that, the source S  transmits these augmented packets 
to its neighbour nodes. 
 
Figure 1. A simple description of RLNC scenario. 
 
During transmission, an intermediate node buffers its 
received packets iu  temporarily and creates a coded packet
y , which is a linear combination of a number of h
augmented packets 1 2, ,..., hu u u  belonging to the same 
generation. The coded packet is represented as follows: 

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where each i pc ∈F  is a random coefficient chosen by each 
intermediate node. A coded packet y  is considered to be 
valid if it is in the linear subspace spanned by the original 
augmented packets. This is denoted as { }, , .1y Span m∈ u u  
In fact, when y  is valid, these linear combination 
coefficients are the first m  symbols of the packet y . 
Otherwise, y  is invalid and it is denoted as
{ }, ,1y Span m∉ u u  , which may be caused by transmission 
errors or pollution attacks. After transmission, when a sink 
node has obtained m  linearly independent coded packets, it 
can decode those using Gaussian eliminations, so as to 
recover the original packets that belong to the same 
generation [23].  
B. Null Space Properties 
 Typically, Null space is the set of solutions to the 
equation . 0A x =  , where 0  is understood as the zero 
vector. Consider a linear map represented as a 
  nm ×  
matrix A  with coefficients in a finite field pF . The main 
idea in Null space is based on the randomization and the 
subspace properties of random network coding. In the other 
hand, in RLNC, the source native packets form a subspace 
and any linear combination of these native packets belongs 
to that same subspace. For more simplicity, we use Null keys 
terminology instead of Null space. However, these null keys 
are not randomly generated but calculated at the source node 
(0, ,0 ,1,0, ,0, , , )  
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(e.g. via Singular Value Decomposition (SVD)), to ensure 
their orthogonality to the subspace spanned by the data 
vectors in a generation ( { }, ,1Span mu u ). Similar to the 
source native packets, the null keys go through random linear 
combinations, which makes it hard for a malicious node to 
identify them at its neighbors.  
C. Adversary Models 
     For the above mentioned network coding-enabled model, 
we consider that the source is always trusted and there is no 
possibility to forge it, but the intermediate and sink nodes 
can be compromised. The adversary is able to wiretap all the 
data packets that are transmitted over a network. The 
adversary’s goal is to achieve pollution attack. There are 
two types of pollution attack: 
 Data pollution attack: an adversary can inject fake data 
packets into the network. The objective of data pollution 
attack is to pass the verification of other innocent nodes, and 
to cause incorrect decoding at the sink node, as well as 
wasting of bandwidth.   
 Tag pollution attack: an adversary injects a corrupted 
packet consisting of correct data but modified tags to the 
network. The objective of tag pollution is to discard the 
correct data packets due to the corresponding corrupted tags. 
This results in the waste of bandwidth.  
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME 
A. Outline  
    To generate the required MACs and D-MACs, our 
scheme consists of three steps. In step 1, it computes the l  
MACs (i.e., tags) for each message according to the keys 
which are chosen randomly from a set of secret keys, SK . 
Then, in step 2, our scheme computes a number of D-MACs 
(i.e., tags of tags), which should satisfy an orthogonality 
property of the initial MACs calculated in step 1, and it is 
calculated by using the properties of Null keys which was 
defined in the previous section. Finally, in step 3, the 
computed MACs and D-MACs are appended to the 
message. These three steps are depicted in Figure 2. 
B. Construction 
    This scheme includes four steps: Setup, Tag Generation, 
Verification and Encoding detailed as follows. 
1. Setup: 
a. Key Distribution Centre (KDC) distributes the 
following set of secret keys (i.e., key vectors) to the 
source node :S  
 
    { } 1, , ,1 2 , m nl i pS + +∈= k k k k FK      (3) 
b. KDC also distributes the following subsets of secret 
vectors to all intermediate nodes and sink nodes: 
{ } , 1, ,1 m nR pi rn
+ +
∈= k k kK F  (4) 
2. Tag generation: For every data packet 
 
m n
i p
+∈u F , of 
each generation consisting of m data packets, the 
source uses the equations (5)  and (6) to generate the l  
MACs and l′  D-MACs, respectively: 
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3. Verification: When a relay or sink node receives a 
coded packet m ny p
+∈F  with its tags, this node 
checks the correctness of packet y using the algorithm 
Verify via its pre-distributed keys
ni
K . If the results of 
following equations are 0, the received coded packet y
is correct and the output is 1; otherwise the output is 0 
and then this packet is discarded. 
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4. Encoding: When an intermediate node receives h
encoded packets ( )1m ni p i h+∈ ≤ ≤u F , and they all 
are checked or considered to be correct, a forward coded 
packet along with new tags is generated using the 
Combine
( ) ( )' ',1 , ,1 , 11, t , t , t , , t ,i i i i h hL L i ii ci ′ ==   u u u uu    
algorithm with locally randomly generated coefficients 
ic . 
IV. THE CORRECTNESS OF PROPOSED SCHEME 
    Our proposed scheme is correct if the Verify 
algorithm passed the verification by getting 1 for the 
output of the two following algorithms. Our first 
algorithm (i.e., Algorithm 1) provides resistant against 
pollution attack; and the second one (i.e., Algorithm 2) 
takes care of tag pollution attacks.   
 Figure 2. Our proposed scheme description. In the first step, we make l  MACs (i.e., tags) by choosing l sets of keys from pool keys. Next, in step 2, we 
use the same keys to generate l′ D-MACs (we use l′ of l keys which is used for the first step). Finally, in step 3, we append these l MACS and l′ D-
MACs at the end of message packet. 
 
The Algorithm 2 is run whenever the Algorithm 1 is given 1 
as the result; otherwise the native packet is discarded.  
 
Algorithm 1. 
1. Begin 
2. Count=0; 
3. For all the keys which each node has 
If ( )( ), , ( ) 1,Verify Mn Si ACi i =u uK K  
                    then count=count++ 
                 else continue            
4.  If count>0  
                 Then Call Algorithm 2;//it provides pollution attack    resistance 
Else Discard iu  
5. End 
 
Theorem 1: The Algorithm 1 is correct. 
Proof: According to the description of “Setup” and the PKD 
method [24] that we use, there is a key l r=k k  for l r= . As a 
result, by letting ,y i l r= =u k k , and calculating ,t y r   
from Equation (5), then for sure, according to Equation (7), 
we have that: 0,
ir r n
δ = ∀ ∈k K .  
As a result, the Algorithm 1 is correct: 
( )( ), , ( ) 1,Verify Mn Si ACi i =u uK K                                          ■  
 
Theorem 2: The Algorithm 2 is correct. 
Proof: According to Equation (6), the D-MACs are created 
in a way that lk is orthogonal to the concatenation of  ,t jiu
and  
,r
t
i
′
u
where 
 ( =1,..., ),  ( =1,..., )j l r l′ . It can be represented 
as: 
, , ,r( )i i ii jk t t′⊥u u u . This relationship is true for all 
packets in the same generation.  
We assume that an adversary modifies d  tags (i.e., it  or 
jt′ ), so regarding the Equation (6),  If we assigned only one 
key vector to each node, the possibility of getting the result 
1 is equal to 
1
dp
and it is very small1. However, according 
to the key distribution model, we assign more than one 
vector keys, and it means that modifying any tags would be 
impossible and it will be detected immediately.   Thus, the 
probability of a packet with modified tags passing the 
verification at two nodes is small and the second Algorithm 
is also correct.                                                                      ■  
Algorithm 2. 
1. Begin 
2. Count=0; 
3. For all the keys which each node has 
If 
( )( ), ( ),D MAC( ) 1, ,n SVerify M iSi AC i − =u uK K K  
                then     count=count++      
               else continue   
4. If count>0       
                 then Accept iu  
Else Discard iu  
5. End 
V. DISCUSSION 
     As outline in Section II, we assume the source node is 
trustworthy and the process of key pre-distribution is secure. 
Hence, the secret key sets Sk , assigned to the source node 
are considered secure. 
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 If 82p
=F F and 2d = , this probability should be 1 0.001%162
≈
 . 
 Table I. Computational Complexity. L and N  are the total number of tags which is used in [18] and [25], respectively. 
 
At the source node At each node (intermediate or sink node) 
MacSig [18] ( 1) ( 1)m n L m L+ + + + +  3 ( 1) ( 1)
2
p m L m n L+ + + + +  
KEPTE [25] ( )N m n+  ( )N m n+  
Our Proposed Scheme ( 1) ( )l m n l l l′ ′+ + + +  ( 1) ( )l m n l l′+ + + +  
 
 
However, an adversary can wiretap all the data 
communication in a network and may compromise several 
relay or sink nodes. Hence, the adversary can get access to 
the received packets from the previous hops, the key 
information distributed to him by the KDC and the key 
information stored at the compromised nodes. We consider 
three types of attacks as the following: 
A. Data Pollution attack 
   If an adversary makes any change in the native packet, it 
is detected immediately; however, there is a possibility to 
travel more hops if these hops don’t have the key. This 
probability is negligible. 
B. Tag Pollution attack (i.e., MACs) 
   By checking the result of Algorithm 2, if an adversary 
makes any change in any tags, it is detected immediately. 
C. Tag Pollution attack (i.e., D-MACs) 
   Regarding the tags (i.e., D-MACs) which are based on 
Null space properties and calculated by source node, there is 
no possibility to alter these tags. 
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
     In this section we provide a communication and 
computational complexity comparison of our proposed 
scheme and the two related works which can resist against 
tag pollution attacks [18], [25].  
 
A. Communication Overhead 
   In [18], the MacSig scheme generates L  MACs and a 
signature. This scheme uses a variable number of MACs 
which is calculated by 
1 1( 1) ln
1
L e cδ ε= +−  , where δ  
and ε  are security parameters, and c is the number of 
compromised nodes. Their idea relies on calculating L  
MACs and a signature by a source node. Totally, 1L +  tags 
are appended at the end of each native packet. An 
intermediate node or sink node should verify each received 
packet by using the verification algorithm. We set the 
number MACs equal to l  where this value is less than the 
number of MACs which is used in [18] (i.e., L ). Moreover, 
we consider the value of l′  as the number of D-MACs, 
where this value can be less or equal to l . In other word, the 
total number of tags which be used in our proposed scheme 
is l l L′+  .  
    However, the idea of [25] is based on generating N tags 
and appending these tags to each native packet. According 
to their consideration, this value is somehow equal to L . To 
end this section, our proposed scheme provides a less 
communication overhead in comparing to the related works. 
 
B. Computational Complexity 
 
    For providing L  MACs and a signature at a source node, 
MacSig [18] needs to use ( 1)L m n+ +  and ( 1)m L+ +  
multiplications, respectively. However, for verification 
phase, it needs to do multiplications and exponentiations, 
where according to their setup parameters; it should be 
equal to 
3 ( 1) ( 1)
2
p m L m n L+ + + + +  multiplications 
totally.  
    However, KEPTE [25] needs to calculate ( )N m n+  
multiplications2.  
    In our proposed scheme, we need to generate l l′+  tags. 
So, a source node needs to do  ( 1) ( )l m n l l l′ ′+ + + +  
multiplications. However, each node needs to verify a 
received packet by calculating ( 1) ( )l m n l l′+ + + +
multiplications. For more detail, see Table I. 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper studied the problem of pollution and tag 
pollution attacks in wireless networks based on the technique 
of network coding. Previous studies demonstrated that 
network coding can provide an achievable throughput and 
robustness compared to traditional store-and-forward 
transmission paradigm. In our proposed scheme, a 
lightweight encryption scheme on top of network coding, to 
further to provide resistance against data pollution and tag 
pollution attacks by using two types of tags (i.e., MACs and 
D-MACs) was presented. We showed that our proposed 
scheme is efficient in computation, and incurs less 
communication overhead and keys storage for 
encryptions/decryptions.  
                                                          
2
 Similarly to the MacSig scheme and considering to the time is needed for 
addition which is negligible in comparing to multiplication, we don’t count 
the number of additions which are needed in all schemes.  
Our future work includes extending the application of 
proposed scheme to other communication networks, e.g., 
vehicular ad hoc networks. Moreover, we may aim to 
simulate our proposed scheme in future. 
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